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Jurisdiction Over Misbehaving Children and Their
Parents Under the New Indiana Juvenile Law
LEE E. TEITELBAUM*

If one wished to find a pure example of traditional juvenile court
jurisdiction, Indiana law until 1976 would have served well. The jurisdictional definitions of that statute, essentially unchanged since creation of
the court itself in 1905, read as follows:
"Delinquent Child" defined ....
The words "delinquent child" shall include any boy under
the full age of sixteen [16] years and any girl under the full age
of eighteen [18] years:
Who shall violate any law of this state or any ordinance of
a city;
Or who is incorrigible;
Or who knowingly associates with thieves or other vicious
or immoral persons;
Or who is growing up in idleness or crime;
Or who knowingly visits or patronizes any policy shop or
place where any gaming device is or shall be operated;
Or who patronizes, visits, or enters any saloon or wineroom where intoxicating liquors are sold;
Or who knowingly patronizes, visits or enters any public
pool-room or bucket-shop;
Or who wanders about the streets of any city in the nighttime without being on any lawful business or occupation;
Or who wanders about in any railroad yards or upon
railroad tracks;
Or who jumps upon any moving train or enters any car or
engine without lawful authority;
Or who uses vile, obscene, vulgar, profane or indecent
language;
Or who smokes cigarettes;
Or who loiters about any school building or school yard;
Or who is guilty of indecent or immoral conduct .... 1
*B.A. 1963, LL.B. 1966, Harvard University; LL.M. 1968, Northwestern University.
Professor of Law, University of New Mexico. The author very gratefully acknowledges the
helpful comments of his colleagues, Professors James Ellis and Robert Schwartz, and the

dedicated assistance of two most able and underpaid students, Ms. Francesca MacDowell
and Ms. Ellen Kelley.
'IND. CODE ANN. § 31-5-4-1 (Burns 1973)(repealed 1975) was directly descended from the
original 1905 statute, 1905 Acts ch. 145, § 1. The language of this statute was substan-
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Such a provision incorporates every strategy for extending jurisdictional
control over children except abandonment of the rule of law itself. It
reaches behavior which would be criminal if done by an adult and that
which would not; misconduct directed at strangers and intrafamily conflict; acts that are listed with great particularity and, in the event the list
is not quite exhaustive, conditions (such as "growing up in idleness or
crime") which are designedly vague and comprehensive.
If it seems that this statute would reach every child about whom concern might for any reason be entertained, that was its intent. And if it
seems as well that a vast array of misbehavior was subject to identical
sanction, that also was intended. Traditional juvenile court theory was
almost entirely concerned with the condition of the children with whom it
dealt rather than with either their specific acts or the relationship of
those acts to rules of law. 2 Judge Julian Mack expressed this positivist
view of juvenile law with unmatched clarity when he suggested that
"[t]he problem for determination by the [juvenile court] judge is not, Has
this boy or girl committed a specific wrong, but What is he, how has he
become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the in'3
terest of the state to save him from a downward career."
Judge Mack's view, which was widely shared by proponents of the
juvenile court movement, 4 logically calls for abandonment of specific
rules defining the occasion for intervention and for substitution of a
statute which simply authorizes intervention upon a showing of need for
treatment. This would have been a revolutionary step in our system of
law, but would accurately have reflected the goals of the "child-savers"
who called forth the juvenile court.5 Ultimately this step was not taken.
tially modified in 1976, IND. CODES § 31-5-7-4.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979)(repealed 1979), but, except for the elimination of murder from juvenile court jurisdiction, its reach remained
essentially the same. While the listing of specific acts of misconduct was removed, most of
them remain within the court's purview either through separate statutes making the
behavior wrongful or as a basis for a finding of incorrigibility.
2
In this, the juvenile court falls squarely within the current of positivist criminology.
Classical criminology primarily concerned itself with the relationship of rules governing
behavior to social institutions. Thus, for Montesquieu, "[p]olitical liberty consists of
security, or at least the belief that one is secure. This security is never more threatened
than by public or private accusations of crime. It is, thus, on the excellence of criminal laws
that the liberty of the citizen principally depends." MONTESQUIEU.De L'Espritdes Lois, L.
XII, ch. 2, in OEUVRES DE MONTESQUIEU 280 (1843) (author's trans.). For a positivist, in
contrast, attention is devoted to the condition or needs of the actor rather than to the relationship
of his act to legal institutions. See D. MATZA. DELINQUENCY AND DRIFr 3-4 (1964).
3
Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119-20 (1909).
4
See, e7g., Van Waters, The Juvenile Court from the Child's Viewpoin4 in THE CHILD. THE
CLINIC. AND THE COURT

217 (J. Addams ed. 1925).

'Traditional juvenile court theory, taken whole, would have replaced our accustomed
system of justice by prescriptive rules with instrumental rules not specified in advance
and defined only by reference to some general social goal (such as prevention of crime).
Such a statute might read, for example, "the Juvenile Court shall have jurisdiction over
any child for whom intervention is necessary to assure his sound development." This
would mean, at base, abandonment of what is ordinarily described as the rule of law. See
Katz & Teitelbaum, PINS Jurisdiction,the Vagueness Doctrine, and the Rule of Law, 53
IND. L.J. 1 (1977-78).
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However, juvenile court legislation, as the original Indiana statute
reveals, came as close to that ideal as reliance on prescriptive rules
allowed. By incorporating extensive jurisdictional grants, these statutes
sought to reach any child in need of help, however unimportant his or her
behavior might seem by itself. Moreover, traditional statutes treated all
the children it reached in much the same way. Criminal conduct, noncriminal misbehavior, and parental neglect 6 were each principally important not as discrete forms of misconduct but as symptoms of maladjustment. In each instance, intervention was thought necessary because
of the apprehension that, without assistance, the child would engage in
future wrongdoing; 7 in each, the necessity for intervention was attributed
to parental failure of some kind;8 for each, the same remedy-rehabili-

tation through governmental services-was the same.9

Given these premises, there was no reason to differentiate among
degrees of criminal conduct for adults nor to distinguish criminal from
noncriminal misconduct. And, indeed, no formal differentiation existed
under traditional law and practice. Statutes such as that formerly gov-

6Neglect statutes were an integral part of juvenile court jurisdiction, and shared much
the same characteristics as provisions addressed to delinquency. The original Indiana law,
which again could stand for many others in its reach, defined as neglected any child of appropriate age
who has not proper parental care or guardianship; or who habitually begs or
receives alms; or who is found living in any house of ill fame, or with any
vicious or disreputable persons; or who is employed in any saloon; or whose
home, by reason of neglect, cruelty or depravity on the part of its parent or
parents, guardian or other person in whose care it may be, is an unfit place for
such child; or whose environment is such as to warrant the state, in the interest of the child, in assuming its guardianship.
IND. CODE ANN. 31-5-5-2 (Burns 1973)(renealed 1974). which was drawn from 1907 Acts ch.
41, § 2, at 59. Section 31-5-5-1 reached "dependent" children who are defined as youths
"dependent upon the public for support, or... destitute, homeless, or abandoned."
7
in true delinquency cases, where the child has violated some generally applicable law,
the prediction of dangerousness involved is the same as that relied upon in the case of
adults. See generally Katz, Dangerousness:A TheoreticalReconstruction of the Criminal
Law (pt. I) 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1970), (pt. 11) 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 603 (1972). For evidence
that incorrigibility and neglect jurisdiction were also founded on an apprehension that the
child who was disobedient or neglected would develop into a law violator, see Teitelbaum &
Harris, Some Historical Prespectives on Governmental Regulation of Children and
Parents,in BEYOND CONTROL 1 (1977); Fox, JuvenileJusticeReform: An HistoricalPerspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970).
'See notes 85-86 & accompanying text infra.
"See, e.g., Mack, supra note 3, at 107:
Why is it not just and proper to treat these juvenile offenders, as we deal with
the neglected children, as a wise and merciful father handles his own child
whose errors are not discovered by the authorities?
...[I]t is this thought-the thought that the child who has begun to go
wrong, who is incorrigible, who has broken a law or an ordinance, is to be
taken in hand by the state.., because either the unwillingness or inability of
the natural parents to guide it toward good citizenship has compelled the intervention of the public authorities [that characterizes the juvenile court].
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erning Indiana practice authorized use of the entire range of dispositional
alternatives, from probation to confinement in an industrial school, for
any child found "delinquent," regardless of the underlying charge. 0
Moreover, empirical evidence indicates that, in many jurisdictions, no
particular relationship existed in fact between the "offense" committed
and the dispositional order entered." Incorrigible children were virtually
as likely to find themselves in an industrial school as those who com12
mitted crimes.
Over the last two decades, however, a considerable body of revisionist
legislation and literature has appeared. According to this school, children
who are "incorrigible" or engage in other conduct wrongful only for
minors (such as truancy or curfew violation) ought not be treated the
same as children who commit seriously antisocial (i.e., criminal) acts.
Several grounds for differentiation are typically urged. The first is that,
despite all hopes to the contrary, the term "delinquency" has become a
highly stigmitizing label, connoting "junior criminality." In view of this
development, it is inappropriate to apply such a label to children who
have not in fact committed any crime." Moreover, the argument continues, it cannot safely be assumed that children who are disobedient or
run away are "bad," or even that their acts are "bad," whereas the
wrongfulness of criminal misconduct is axiomatic. 4 Finally, those who
argue for change in jurisdictional standards suggest that the kinds of
treatment appropriate for children who commit crimes may not be appropriate for children whose problem is conflict within the family.15 In"OUnder the prior Indiana Code, a court, upon a finding of delinquency (which included all
forms of criminal and noncriminal misbehavior) could make any order allowed by the
statute. Its discretion was governed not by the specific conduct involved but presumably
by its view of the child's best interests. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-5-7-15 (Burns 1973)(repealed
1979). This was also true under the 1976 revision. IND. CODE § 31-5-7-15 (1976)(repealed
1979).
"See W. STAPLETON & L. TEITELBAUM. IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH 134 (1972).
"See, e.g., M. RECTOR. PINS: AN AMERICAN SCANDAL (1974) (estimating that between 45
and 55 percent of the 66,000 youths confined in training schools are status offenders);
Klapmuts, Children'sRights: The Legal Right of Minors in Conflict with Law or Social
Custom, 4 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY LIT. 449, 470-71 (1972).

"sSee, e.g.,

N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON COURT REORGANIZATION. THE FAMILY

COURT ACT.
[The Committee] finds, however, that an "adjudication of delinquency" as a
practical matter may have a damaging effect on a child and on his career as a
citizen. Indeed, the common understanding is that such an adjudication involves a youth who commits crimes ....
The
T Committee has been asked to avoid the need for an adjudication of
"delinquency" [for noncriminal misbehavior].
1962 N.Y. Laws, 3428, 3434.
"The Standard Juvenile Court Act, an early model statute which created a separate
jurisdictional category for noncriminal misconduct, was espoused on the ground that it
"properly lays no blame in a situation where a child is 'beyond the control of his parent.'"
Rubin, Legal Definition of Offenses by Children and Youths, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 512, 514.
"See N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON COURT REORGANIZATION: II THE FAMILY
COURT ACT, at 7 (1962).
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deed, in an echo of the original juvenile court theory, which sought to
separate erring children from "hardened" adult offenders, the point is
made that commitment of children who have not committed crimes with
those who have may lead to the corruption of the former and, thereby, to
more serious behavior on their part. 16
Adoption of these views has resulted in division of what was traditionally "delinquency" jurisdiction into two distinct categories, one of
which is still denominated "delinquency" but reserved for criminal
misconduct, and the other one bearing some new title (such as "Persons
in Need of Supervision" (PINS) or the like) which reaches behavior
wrongful only for children. 17 The strength of this development is conveyed by the fact that, while no state limited the definition of "delinquency" to criminal acts in 1950,18 approximately half of all current
juvenile codes now do so.
The new Indiana Juvenile Law, effective in October of 1979,19
represents a compromise between the traditional approach that has obtained since 1905 and the revisionist school. Certainly it follows the traditional view in its definition of delinquent acts, which includes not only
commission of crime but departure from home without reasonable cause
or permission, truancy, habitual disobedience to the reasonable and
lawful commands of his parent, guardian, or custodian, and curfew violation. 20 It is equally certain, however, that the new code departs from the
traditional approach in a number of respects. In connection with assertion of jurisdiction itself, it differentiates the wrongfulness or
seriousness of criminal and noncriminal misbehavior in much the same
way that a revisionist would. The jurisdiction of the court is based upon a
finding that the respondent is a "delinquent child. 2 1 Whereas any child
who commits a crime is, for that reason alone, a "delinquent child" and
therefore subject to the court's dispositional power, a youth who is
charged with any other kind of "delinquent act" can only be found a
"delinquent child" upon two separate findings: first, that he did such an
act and, second, that he "needs care, treatment or rehabilitation that he
is not receiving, that he is unlikely to accept voluntarily, and that is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the
court."2 2 Moreover, even if such a showing is made, incorrigible or

ungovernable children cannot be committed to either the state industrial
school or a secure private facility. They may only be placed on probation,

6See, e.g., Gough, Beyond-Control Youth in the Juvenile Court-The Climatefor Change,
in BEYOND CONTROL 271, 273 (1977).
'"For a review of current treatment of noncriminal misbehavior, see ic app., at 297.
"Rubin, The Legal Characteristicsof Juvenile Delinquency, in JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
25, 26 (R. Gialombardo ed. 1966).
"IND. CODE §§ 31-6-1-1 to -10-4 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
20
1Id. § 31-6-4-1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
1Id. § 31-6-4-1(b).
"Id. § 31-6-4-1(b)(2).
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ordered to participate in out-patient treatment, or placed in a foster home
or nonsecure shelter care facility. 3 And, under certain circumstances, the
child whose conflict is with his parents may be emancipated rather than
24
brought back into line.
In quite another direction, however, the new Juvenile Law reaches even
further than either its predecessors or most jurisdictions now providing
differential treatment for criminal and noncriminal misconduct. While
traditional theory frankly held parental failure responsible for youthful
misconduct,2 5 it never pursued this assumption to its logical conclusion
by making parents as well as children directly subject to the court's
power.2 6 And, though a revisionist may also see the parents as equally
blameworthy or even more so, 27 the child usually remains the sole party
to proceedings based on his incorrigibility. The new Indiana law expressly provides, however, that the parents of a child charged with delinquency may be made parties for dispositional purposes and, therefore,
may be required to participate in some therapeutic regimen together with
28
the child who is the initial respondent in the case.
The purpose of the following discussion is to examine this compromise.
Part I addresses the accommodation between traditional and revisionist
positions concerning the treatment of juvenile offenders. Part II considers the Code's extension of jurisdiction to the parents of delinquents
together with the issues that enterprise presents. The last part raises a
number of questions concerning the premises behind and effectiveness of
continued court jurisdiction over children who engage solely in noncriminal misbehavior.
THE OLD AND THE NEW IN TREATMENT OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS

The Definition of Delinquency
Commission of Crime
The Indiana law defines delinquency, as we have seen, in a traditional
sense, including both criminal and noncriminal misbehavior. Ordinarily,
the first of these provisions, defining delinquency in terms of "an act that
would be a crime if committed by an adult," would occasion no comment.
231

241d.

§ 31-6-4-16(e), -16(g).
§ 31-6-4-16(e)(5).

"5See note 8 & accompanying text supra.
"6Curiously, a number of jurisdictions hold the parents responsible in tort for damage
done by their children in connection with delinquent behavior, but do not make them parties to juvenile court proceedings and therefore cannot directly require their participation
in a treatment program. On the tort liability of parents, see IND. CODE § 31-5-10-1 (Cum.
Sup. 1979)(repealed 1979); Note, A Constitutional Caveat on the Vicarious Liability of
Parents,47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1321 (1972).
"See Rubin, supra note 14, at 514.
8
' 1NDo CODE § 31-6-4-16(i) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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However, the scope of this conventional provision is expanded by definition of the apparently innocuous term "crime" to mean "an offense for
which an adult might be imprisoned under the law of the jurisdictionin
which it is committed."29 The latter definition, it has been observed,
clarifies the law by authorizing an Indiana court to assert jurisdiction
over a child who commits an offense in, say, Ohio, or violates a federal
statute.30
This clarification raises interesting and difficult questions as to crimes
committed in other states.3 1 It certainly rejects the ancient learning of
The Antelope 32 in which Chief Justice Marshall reiterated the general
proposition that "[t]he Courts of no country execute the penal laws of
another ... .-33 While this doctrine has been qualified with respect to civil
laws having some punitive aspect 34 and even as to criminal violations
which have some connection with the forum state,3' the Indiana statute

draws none of these lines. Its terms reach criminal acts planned, begun,
and concluded outside the forum state and with no effect upon that state.
Perhaps the extraterritoriality provision can be seen as an effort to provide rehabilitation in the jurisdiction where the offender will probably
live.3 8 In this, it follows the general tradition of juvenile court theory. If,
as that theory would have it, the principal concern of the juvenile court is
to rehabilitate the child rather than to allow an injured community opportunity to express its outrage or to republish the bounds of its laws, it is
sensible to allocate jurisdiction to the court where rehabilitation can best
be carried out (ordinarily, where the child resides) rather than to the court
where the injury occurred. 37 Whether such a justification can withstand
291d. § 31-6-1-2 (emphasis added).
30Kerr, Foreward.Indiana'sNew Juvenile Code, 12 IND. L. REV. 1, 4 (1979). The Illinois
definition of delinquency is equally broad, reaching any crime, "regardless of where the act
occurred." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-2 (1978). However, no reported cases deal with this
provision, and its validity remains open.
"Jurisdiction over acts that would constitute federal crimes, such as robbery of a
federally-insured bank, presents no issues that do not obtain with respect to state criminal
court jurisdiction over the same acts.
3223 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
"Id. at 123.
"Leflar, ExtrastateEnforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 HARV. L. REV.
193, 204-05 (1932).
"'As, for example, where the crime committed elsewhere produces an effect in the home
state, or a resident of the home state is an accessory to a crime carried out elsewhere. See
George, ExtraterritorialApplication of Penal Legislation, 64 MICH.L. REV. 609, 622-23
(1966); Rotenberg, ExtraterritorialLegislativeJurisdictionand the State CriminalLaw, 38
TEx. L. REV. 763, 770-80 (1960); Berge, CriminalJurisdictionand the TerritorialPrinciple,
30 MICH. L. REV. 238 (1931).
"This notion may be reflected, although imperfectly, in the venue provision allowing proceedings to be brought in the county where the delinquent act occurred or where the child
resides. IND. CODE § 31-6-7-7(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979). One wonders whether this theory, if it indeed exists, would not better be served, however, by requiring that at least dispositional
hearings be held in the county of residence, wherever the wrongful act occurred.
"It
may appear that the provision seeks to assure that some state will be able to asset
jurisdiction over the child, since extradition does not ordinarily reach juvenile offenders
and the Interstate Compact on Juveniles only requires return of children already ad-
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the constitutional and policy issues created by extraterritorial jurisdiction is not, however, so apparent as its rationale.
In point of law and policy, a provision of this kind creates significant
questions. There are sound reasons, some of which may reach constitutional proportions, for generally requiring that prosecution for crime occur in the place where it was committed.3 8 One class of concerns is attributable to notions of sovereignty. It is true that the Indiana law does
not seek to apply its own definition of crime to acts committed elsewhere,
thereby avoiding a traditional objection to extraterritorial statutes.3 9
However, the statute does present the question of whether the legislative
jurisdiction of a state is not confined to the geographical location of acts
or omissions and their effects. 4 The only basis upon which jurisdiction
would seem to be based is the citizenship of the respondent, and even this
41
is not expressly required by the juvenile code.

judicated delinquent. However, Indiana has adopted the optional Rendition Amendment
(amendment 2) to the Interstate Compact on Juveniles, IND. CODE § 31-6-10-1 (Cum. Supp.
1979), which authorizes rendition of a child alleged to be delinquent to the state in which
the charge arose if that state has also specifically adopted the Rendition Amendment. As
between Indiana and a state which has likewise chosen to use this amendment, therefore,
the extraterritoriality provision is unnecessary to assure that some court will be able to obtain jurisdiction.
38
A variety of reasons might be presented as justifying refusal to enforcce in
one state obligations, either civil or criminal in nature, which have arisen
under the laws of another state. Some of these reasons have already been
mentioned in previous paragraphs; others have not. They may be very briefly
summarized as (1) historical reasons based on the intensely local character of
early legal systems, including the fact of collective responsibility of the community for acts done within its borders and the notion of the trial body as a
jury of neighbors personally acquainted with the facts in the case; (2) respect
for the sovereign rights and pretensions of foreign states and nations,
coupled with the idea that the diplomatic processes of extradition and interstate rendition would give adequate relief against absconding parties; (3) procedural difficulties, such as the non-availability at the forum of a remedy by
which reasonably equivalent relief could be assured, and the traditional procedure in criminal cases of action brought by the injured state as a plaintiff;
(4) local public policy opposing the type of claim presented for enforcement;
(5) very real practical inconveniences, particularly (a) the added expense to
taxpayers of conducting trials and enforcing sentences and judgments, coupled with possible overcrowding of dockets by unnecessarily imported suits, (b)
expense and hardship to the defendant from having to appear with witnesses
at a distance from the place where the events in question occurred, (c)
possibly increased difficulty of reliable proof of facts at a distance from the
place of their occurrence, and (d) possible ignorance and difficulty of proof of
foreign law as such; (6) American constitutional guaranties to criminal defendants of the right to trial by jury in the vicinity of the offense.
Leflar, supra note 34, at 201-02.
9
"0See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
4 Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Choice of Law in Criminal Cases, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 44
(1974). Professor Leflar also argues that criminal claims are "local" rather than "transitory" actions. Id at 48.
"While it is generally said that citizenship is sufficient to establish jurisdiction in the
context of international law, it is not plain that the same basis will suffice for domestic purposes. Moreover, the Indiana Juvenile Code nowhere requires that a child, to be subject to
juvenile court jurisdiction, be a citizen or resident of Indiana. The venue provision re-
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Another set of problems concerns the procedural due process claims of
an accused, who may be hard put to investigate and prepare a defense
against a charge of crime which took place elsewhere. In the area of
criminal proceedings, it has been suggested, a statute allowing such a
prosecution may offend federal and state consitutitonal rights to trial by
jury in the state41 or county 43 where the crime was committed. It is a nice
and novel question whether that proposition, if it indeed applies in the
criminal arena, would operate with respect to delinquency proceedings.
The United States Supreme Court has held that there is no federal constitutional right to trial by jury in such matters, 44 and the Indiana
Supreme Court has reached the same conclusion with respect to the state
constitutional jury trial provision. 45 At first glance, therefore, it seems
that since there is no right to jury trial at all in delinquency cases, there
cannot be a right to jury trial in any particular venue. It might, however,
be suggested that the right to trial by jury and the right to trial in the
locality where the crime was committed are separate, or at least
separable. The "jury" aspect involves a right to a trier of fact drawn from
the community rather than from the ranks of governmental employees.
This, it has been held, is both unnecessary to accurate fact-finding and
destructive of certain traditional values which ought be preserved in
juvenile court proceedings. 46 The locality aspect, on the other hand, pro-

tects the respondent from removal from a friendly and supportive community to a potentially hostile one (which will not happen under the Indiana law), and also provides some assurance that the accused will have
access to witnesses and evidence necessary to preparation of his
defense.47 The latter interest is surely compromised by the extraterritoriality provision of the juvenile code. The poverty of most juvenile
court clients and the budgetary limitations characteristic of public
defender offices and appointed counsel arrangements make it unlikely
quires, however, that juvenile court proceedings be brought in the county where the child
resides or the act occurred, IND. CODE § 31-6-7-7(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979), which may act as a
residence requirement in this situation.
42
The 6th amendment entitles a defendant to trial by "an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed .... U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Recalling that the Bill of Rights only limited the powers of Congress until passage of the 14th
amendment, it seems that the primary concern of the 6th amendment lay with placement
of venue for federal crimes in federal courts sitting far distant from the locus of the
criminal activity. However, the reason for this concern seems applicable to prosecutions by
states as well: As Mr. Justice Story observed, in discussing this amendment, "a trial in a
distant state or territory might subject the party to the most oppressive expenses, or
perhaps even to the inability of procuring the proper witnesses to establish his innocence."
2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 528 (2d ed. 1851).
4
The Indiana Constitution provides that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall have the right to a public trial, by an impartial jury, in the county in which the offense
shall
have been committed .. " IND. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
4
1McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
4
1Bible v. State, 253 Ind. 373, 254 N.E.2d 319 (1970).
"76McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
4 See note 42 supra.
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that juvenile respondents would ordinarily be able to investigate and
prepare to defend against charges arising out of state, which in turn
necessarily prejudices the process by which factual determinations will
be made. To the extent that substantial interference with the accuracy of
the adjudicative process is implicated, the statute presents grave due
process problems in precisely the area that has given the Supreme Court
48
most concern.

The same points can be made in connection with the child's right to the
effective assistance of counsel, which is unambiguously secured by constitutional doctrine .4 Failure or inability to investigate the crime
charged and prepare a defense may in itself deny the client effective
assistance or greatly contribute to inadequacy in that respect, as Indiana
courts have consistently recognized.50 While most of the Indiana cases
deal with lack of time to prepare a defense, a statutory scheme which
makes investigation and preparation practically impossible in a great
number of cases would seem to present due process concerns of the same
kind.5 1
Noncriminal Misbehavior
The juvenile law retains the traditional view in labeling "delinquent"
' 8 At base, the Supreme Court's decisions in the juvenile court area involve an attempt to
balance the importance of a procedural safeguard to accuracy in fact determination and its
potential for disruption of the non-punitive and desirable characteristics of traditional
juvenile court procedure. In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court found that provision
of notice, access to counsel, and confrontation of witnesses was essential to accurate adjudication and would not interfere with the benevolent aspects of juvenile court practice.
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), on the other hand, the court held that
introduction of jury trial was not necessary to accurate adjudication and would be highly
disruptive of informal and supportive aspects of delinquency proceedings. If the same approach is taken to the locality rule, the costs in terms of investigative capacity and opportunity to present witnesses for the respondent would seem to weigh heavily on the accuracy side, balanced perhaps against the inability of Indiana - as opposed to the jurisdiction
4 in which the offense was committed - to deal at all with the child for this wrong.
'In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967), the Court recognized a constitutional right to
counsel in delinquency proceedings on the following basis: "A proceeding where the issue
is whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty
for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution. The juvenile needs the
assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts,-.
and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it."
50
"The right to investigate and confer with witnesses as well as subpoena them is included in representation by counsel. 'Compulsory process' is vain if counsel has no time to
make the right available." Hoy v. State, 225 Ind. 428, 436, 75 N.E.2d 915, 918 (1947).
Other cases holding that an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense is an integral part
of the right to counsel itself include Sweet v. State, 233 Ind. 160, 117 N.E.2d 745 (1954),
Bradley v. State, 227 Ind. 131, 84 N.E.2d 580 (1949); Hartman v. State, 155 Ind. App. 199,
292 N.E.2d 293 (1973).
Neglect of adequate factual investigation has been held to constitute incompetent
representation for 6th amendment purposes in United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197
(D.C. Cir. 1973), as has failure to prepare factual defenses for presentation at trial. West v.
State, 478 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973).
5
See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
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children who have not committed crimes as well as those who have. Its
departure from the revisionist position, which finds application of that
label inappropriately stigmatizing for children who engage only in noncriminal forms of misbehavior, is at least initially surprising, since differentiation occurs in other respects. Several rationales for this decision
can, however, be hypothesized. It might be that (1)the legislature did not
think the "delinquency" label stigmatizing; (2) the legislature may have
thought that any label would, immediately or over time, come to be as
disadvantageous as "delinquency" and, therefore, creation of a new label
for noncriminal misconduct would be futile; (3) the legislature thought
the label to be as appropriate for children who are incorrigible or truant
as for those who commit crimes, even if it is stigmatizing; or (4) the
legislature might have decided that, for reasons apart from stigma, it is
more desirable to classify all misbehaving children as a single group than
to differentiate among them.
The first three of these rationales focus on the existence and
significance of stigma for juvenile offenders. The initial hypothesis-that
adjudication as delinquent is not a stigmatizing occurrence-would indeed firmly commit the juvenile law to d traditional view. It was an
article of faith for those who created the juvenile court that its operation
would not create the hostility, fear, and social disadvantage associated
with prosecution in the criminal justice system. 5 To this end, a new
vocabulary for the juvenile court was adopted and is still in use. A child
was a "delinquent" rather than a "criminal," and was so "adjudicated"
rather than "convicted." Institutionalization involved a "disposition"
rather than a "sentence," and the "respondent" (not "defendant") was
placed in a "school" or, at worst, a "reformatory" rather than a jail,
prison or penitentiary. 3 Moreover, records and hearings of the juvenile
court were usually treated as confidential and available only to persons
specifically named by law or having a special interest in the case.14
It is easy to be cynical about the prospects for success of so mild and
well-intentioned an approach, but that would overlook a genuine concern
to avoid the social disadvantage-both formal and informal-intimately
associated with conviction for crime. At the same time, it is by now
tolerably clear that these expectations have been refuted by practical experience. The public is thought to associate delinquency with "junior
criminality" and few persons are misled about the nature of an "in5

"[In this new court we tear down primitive prejudice, hatred, and hostility toward the

lawbreaker.., and we attempt, as far as possible, to administer justice in the name of

truth, love, and understanding." H. Lou. JUVENILE COURT IN THE UNITED
"3See W. STAPLETON & L. TEITELBAUM.supra note 11, at 15.

STATES

2 (1927).

"The original Indiana Juvenile Code treated hearings as confidential, but was amended

in 1957 to leave the question of publicity to the judge's discretion.

IND.CODE

§ 31-5-7-15

(1976)(repealed 1979). The new juvenile law goes even further in the direction of disclosure
of information by recommending that hearings be public in certain cases. I& § 31-6-7-10
(Cum. Supp. 1979).
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dustrial school."55 Nor, as the Supreme Court observed more than ten
years ago in In re Gault, 6 have legislative confidentiality provisions been
effective in maintaining the secrecy of juvenile court proceedings.
It is true that much of the research concerning the operation of stigma
57
cannot be considered conclusive on the direction or extent of effects;
however, its existence cannot reasonably be denied. And, it should be
added, the new juvenile law does not seem overconcerned with minimizing the danger of disadvantageous labeling, since it allows and indeed apparently encourages publicity in connection with certain kinds of delin58
quency proceedings.
The second rationale-that the legislature might have thought that
any label attached to juvenile misbehavior would engender stigma sooner
or later-is more difficult to evaluate. Certainly that assumption cannot
be rejected categorically, and no systematic studies of the effects of labeling in jurisdictions with separate jurisdictional categories for noncriminal misbehavior exist. It seems possible and even likely, however,
that the disadvantage associated with a label such as "PINS" or even
"incorrigible" might be different from that accompanying a label of
"delinquency." The community, to the extent that it is aware of the label
at all, might think differently of the child whose behavior does not involve seriously antisocial acts than it does of one whose conduct they
would classify as "criminal," even if the court does not. The child's peers
might, even more probably, make such a distinction in the way they view
the respondent. That is not to say that no social disadvantage occurs in
consequence of court action for the soi-disant status offender, but that
the disadvantage may be less grave and, perhaps, less permanent.
The third explanation advanced above is not empirically based. The
legislature may have taken the view that, even if a delinquency label is
stigmatizing, it is as appropriate to so treat children who disobey their
parents as it is children who violate the criminal law. Such an assumption
is justified if it can routinely be said that refusal to obey or running away
is wrongful and seriously so, which we take to be true of criminal misconduct. This premise seems, however, increasingly untenable on a number
of grounds. In the first place, family conflict may say quite as much
about parents as it does about children. As Sol Rubin observed some time
ago:

5

See note 13 supra; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967); NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL
HEALTH. INSTEAD OF COURT: DIVERSION IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 11-13 (1971); Gough, The Expungement of AdjudicationRecords of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem of Status,
1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 147.
56387
U.S. 1, 24 (1967).
' 7See Mahoney, The Effect of Labeling upon Youths in the Juvenile Justice System: A
Review of the Evidence, 8 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 583 (1974), for a critical review of the
literature on labeling and stigma.
5
See note 54 supra.
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We have all seen situations ...in which the child beyond control is sound and healthy, and the lack of control is due to attempts at excessive control, to highly disciplinary or
authoritarian attitudes in control, or to some ignorance or
neurotic need on the part of the parent that a normal child may
59
naturally resist.
True, the Indiana law-like many others 60-limits incorrigibility to
disobedience of "reasonable and lawful" parental commands and, with
respect to running away, requires that the child have no "reasonable
cause" for absenting himself from home. 61 These notions are, however, so
indefinable that they cannot be effective instruments for determining
when a child is very wrong and when he is not. A given command or set of
commands may be "reasonable" in light of parental views about how
their child should grow up, which the juvenile court would (and should)
only rarely contradict, and yet be so unusually strict as to provoke
understandable (if not strictly justifible) reaction from the child. The
same may be said of the "good cause" qualification on jurisdiction over
children who run away. One suspects, although there is little decisional
guidance in this area, that "good cause" for leaving home implies severe
parental abuse or neglect. Yet the attitudes described by Rubin, which
will only rarely rise to the level of abuse or neglect, may lead children to
leave home briefly without indicating serious character disorders on their
part.
A second reason for doubting the proposition that noncriminal
misbehavior involves wrongfulness as serious as criminal activity lies in
the nature of the parent-child relationship, within which incorrigibility
and running away take on meaning. This relationship is frequently and
probably universally accompanied by stress and conflict at some point.
Both parents and child seek an accommodation between two legitimate
and interrelated goals: continued socialization and development of
autonomy. The former is a value operational since infancy and for a long
period implies frank control of decisionmaking by the child. As time goes
on, however, socialization also implies facilitating the development of a
capacity for choice if, at some point, meaningful adulthood is to be attained.62 The resulting dynamic has been described in the following way:
As the child grows, the level or degree of parental authority is
reduced, and this reduction corresponds to growth in the
child's capacity for autonomous action and choice. Unless both
parents and children agree with respect to the appropriate ambits of control and autonomy, however, the parents will regard

9

Rubin, supranote 14, at 514.

"E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119,

21 (West Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-3(M) (1978).
"IND. CODE § 31-6-4-1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).

"Katz & Teitelbaum, supra note 5, at 17.

§
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(excessively or prematurely

autonomous), or the child will regard parental authority as un6 3
justified, or both.
If, as seems to be true, conflict between parent and child is universal, it
cannot serve as the basis for a judgment that disobedient conduct indicates something seriously wrong with the child. It is not true that the
vast majority of adults, most of whom engaged at some time in repeated
instances of misbehavior at home, are poorly socialized or even
dangerous, which would be true if youthful misconduct within the family
justified grave concern for the child's future. Rather, most behavior of
this kind is transitory in character, 4 and will be outgrown or rendered irrelevant by the achievement of majority. To treat such behavior in the
65
same way one treats serious crime is both inept and potentially harmful.
Indeed, something of these doubts seems to be reflected in the dispositional provisions of the new Code. Under former law, the judge could,
once a youth was found delinquent, choose any disposition for the respondent, guided only by the child's needs and the largely theoretical limits of
sound discretion. Juveniles who committed crimes could be and
doubtless were released to their families on probation, and others who
were incorrigible could be and frequently were committed to the care of
the Department of Corrections and a secure facility.6 6 Under the new law,
however, a child who has engaged only in noncriminal misconduct can
not be placed in a secure institution of any kind.67 This approach seems
6Id. at 18.
"4See Rosenheim, Notes on Helping Juvenile Nuisances, in PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE
CHILD 43 (1976).
65
Youth after youth, bewildered by the incapacity to assume a role forced on
him by the inexorable standardization of American adolescence, runs away in
one form or another, dropping out of school, leaving jbbs, staying out all
night, or withdrawing into bizarre and inaccessible moods. Once
"delinquent," his greatest need and often his only salvation is the refusal on
the part of older friends, advisers, and judiciary personnel to type him further
by pat diagnoses and social judgments which ignore the special dynamic conditions of adolescence.
E. ERIKSON. IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS 132 (1968).
66
In 1973, it appeared that one-third of the residents of the Indiana Boys School, described as "a medium security state correctional facility for boys 12 to 18 years of age,"
were not guilty of any criminal offense. Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 459 (N.D.Ind.
1972), affd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). The severity of
this sanction is indicated by the opinion in Heyne where the court condemned the use of
corporal punishment, solitary confinement, overcrowding, inadequate staff training, and
lack of program at the Boys School. For a recent instance, see Simmons v. State, Ind.
App. -,
371 N.E.2d 1316 (1978) (commitment of 14-year-old girl who was truant and
incorrigible
to Indiana Girls School).
67
1ND. CODE § 31-6-4-16(g) (Cum. Supp. 1979). A delinquent child who engages in noncriminal misbehavior may be placed on probation, ordered to receive out-patient treatment
at a medical, psychiatric, psychological or educational facility, or placed outside the home
in a foster home or (non-secure) shelter care facility. Id. § 31-6-4-16(a), -16(d). In addition,
any delinquent child may be wholly or partially emancipated where the court finds that he
or she wishes to be free to parental control, is socially and financially capable of independence, and can present an acceptable plan for living away from his or her parents. Id
§ 31-6-4-16(e).
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consistent with the revisionist approach to noncriminal juvenile misconduct and difficult to reconcile with maintenance of the traditional view
concerning labeling of offenders.6 8 Surely prohibition of secure facilities
for youths who are incorrigible or runaway suggests that their behavior
does not require close control and that it is not as dangerous, nor as suggestive of future dangerousness, as violation of a criminal law. While
there is much to be said for this view of noncriminal conduct, its consistency with application of the delinquency label is far from obvious.
If notions of labeling and stigma do not warrant equivalent treatment
of criminal and noncriminal misbehavior, one must look to other explanations for such an approach. It may be that equivalent treatment for purposes of the definition of delinquency is designed not to protect the interests of the noncriminal offenders but of children who do commit
crimes. When "serious" misconduct is removed from the definition of
delinquency jurisdiction, there may be some tendency to lose concern for
delinquents since they appear to be-and are in fact defined as-young
criminals. Sympathy and perhaps services may be reserved for the new
category of children who can be thought of as being victims as often as
they are offenders. For "delinquents," secure detention facilities and industrial schools will suffice.
This concern, if it does motivate the legislative definition of delinquency, is certainly appropriate. Criminality is hardly an undifferentiated category; there are children who have committed serious offenses
and those who have not. A child who puts a BB through his neighbor's
window has committed an act which, when translated into the humorless
language of the criminal code (e.g., Criminal Damage to Property), seems
far more serious than the underlying behavior suggests. Moreover, age
and maturity matter; a thirteen-year-old who rides in a stolen car has
doubtless done something wrong, but may nevertheless be far from a
hardened criminal. And, it should be remembered, there is an avenue for
transferring to adult courts those children whose crimes are very serious
indeed and who do seem committed to antisocial behavior. 69 Accordingly,
the children who remain in the juvenile court system and may be adjudicated delinquent are presumably (and frequently in fact) amenable to
more constructive and less damaging forms of treatment than we employ
for adult offenders.
6
Indeed, the new Code goes farther in the revisionist direction than do many states
which have unreservedly adopted that view. While those jurisdictions have separate labels
for status offenders, the vast majority allow both "delinquents" and "Persons in Need of
Supervision" to be committed to training or industrial schools, in which they receive iden-

tical treatment. IJA-ABA, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECTS. STANDARDS RELATING
TO NON-CRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR 5 (Tent. Dr. 1977) [hereinafter cited as NON-CRIMINAL
MISBEHAVIOR]. And, in even the handful of states which prohibit the commitment of
children who do not commit crimes to institutions housing delinquents, they are commonly
subject to placement in other secure institutions which are pretty much indistinguishable
from industrial schools in facilities and program. See, e.g., IJA, THE ELLERY C. DECISION: A
CASE STUDY OF JUDICIAL REGULATION OF JUVENILE STATUS OFFENDERS (1975).

69IND. CODE

§ 31-6-2-4 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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It is, however, a troubling political compromise which says that we
may treat one group of children inappropriately in order to prevent inappropriate treatment of another group. There is first an ethical question
about whether trading of this sort is legitimate, and there is next the
question of efficacy. Will it reduce the stigma and social disadvantage
visited upon criminal delinquents to make it unclear whether "delinquency" connotes criminal misconduct? Or will it simply result in social
disadvantage to all children labeled "delinquent"? Bad money may drive
out good here as well as in classical economics. The net gain in resources
for the law-violating children may, therefore, be slight, particularly since
service providers are unlikely to be confused about the various meanings
of delinquency.
The Dual Condition
The new juvenile law remains traditional, therefore, in treating both
criminal and noncriminal misconduct as "delinquent acts" and in providing that a youth who engages in either may be labeled a "delinquent
child." However, the law does differentiate according to the nature of the
conduct with respect to the basis upon which a child who commits a delinquent act will be labeled a "delinquent child." Under the former law, commission of a delinquent act made a delinquent child; no inquiry beyond
behavior was required for an assertion of jurisdiction. 70 The new law imports, for some children, what may be called a "dual condition": the
respondent will only be adjudicated a "delinquent child" upon a showing
that he or she not only committed a "delinquent act" but is presently in
need of care, rehabilitation or treatment that will not otherwise be
available or accepted. 71 However, this dual condition operates only with
respect to children whose delinquent acts are noncriminal in nature;
those who commit crimes are for that reason alone delinquent children, as
they were under the previous statute.
Now, it is not unusual for a juvenile code to incorporate a dual condition. Indeed, to do so is perfectly consistent with traditional juvenile
court theory, which has always been more interested in the child's condition than in the specific acts of misconduct that brought him before the
court. Most commonly, this emphasis has resulted in the assertion of
jurisdiction whenever treatment seemed necessary without strict regard
to the competence or sufficiency of proof of particular misconduct.72
However, direction of attention to the child's condition has also led to the
view that, since the occasion for intervention is need for treatment,
jurisdiction will not be asserted where no such need exists, even where
some misbehavior can be established. Accordingly, a number of jurisdic-

70Id

§ 31-5-7-4.1 (repealed 1979).

"Id_ § 31-6-4-1(b).
72
See W. STAPLETON

& L.

TEITELBAUM. supra note

11, at 20-21.
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tions have adopted a definition of delinquency that requires proof both of
a delinquent act and of a present need for coercive intervention, 73 such
adoption usually, but not always, accomplished by statute.
What is unusual about the Indiana version of the dual condition is that
it is imposed only in respect of children whose "delinquent acts" are noncriminal in nature. This limitation may reveal some acceptance of the
revisionist view that not all juvenile misconduct is equal in significance
and that there are cases involving incorrigibility, truancy, running away
or curfew violation in which the child's misconduct does not justify a
prediction of future dangerousness and need for rehabilitation. It is a
recognition that noncriminal misbehavior is ambiguous in what it says
about children, unlike (it seems to follow) behavior in violation of the
criminal law.
In one sense, this is a sensible accommodation of revisionist thought
and traditional labeling. That disobedience may be attributable more to
parental intransigence than to youthful error, and that even habitual
disobedience may be transitory, is recognized through the requirement
that something beyond misconduct be shown to justify an adjudication.
However, once it can be said that there is some ground for concern and intervention, the respondent is in the same position as the child whose
behavior is presumed to be unambiguous, and will be labeled in the same
way.
One wonders, nevertheless, whether this approach does not make both
too little and too much of the distinction between criminal and noncriminal misconduct. It may make too little of it in assuming that the
only difference between them lies in the ambiguity of the conduct. From
the labeling perspective, it is still doubtful that a child whose only conflict is within the home ought to be identified in the same way as a child
who robs, assaults, or kills, as will happen with the child who is incorrigible and is in need of care, supervision or treatment. From a family function perspective, 74 it should be observed that the existence of a need for
care on the child's part does not necessarily mean that the child's conduct
is wrongful and the parent's righteous. Such a finding may simply mean
that the family is sufficiently disrupted that some kind of care is called
for, given the child's circumstances.
In a considerable number of cases, indeed, it may be largely fortuitous
that the matter arises as a delinquency proceeding. A large-scale study of
the processing of incorrigibility (PINS) cases in New York revealed that
about a third of those cases, in most of which the child was incorrigible or
had run away, the facts would equally well have supported a neglect petition against the parents. 75 Whether a disrupted family comes to court
"E.g., In re Johnson, 30 Ill. App. 2d 439, 174 N.E.2d 907 (1961); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 731

(McKinney Supp. 1978-79); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-3(0) (1978).
71See notes 62-65 & accompanying text supra.
76Andrews & Cohn, PINS Processingin New York: An Evaluation, in BEYOND CONTROL
45, 74 (1977).

INDIANA LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 54:539

through a petition initiated by the parents or one directed against them
may depend on nothing more than whether a social worker is already involved with the family (making neglect more likely). In a large number of
other cases, severe neglect may not be present, but the child's behavior is
an improper yet understandable reaction to great parental pressure or demand. Intervention may be desirable simply because communication
within the family has broken down, although without serious wrongdoing
on anyone's part.
Requiring proof of need for care and rehabilitation only in cases involving noncriminal misbehavior seems as well to make too much of the
commission of crime by a young person. Criminal conduct can also be an
uncertain predictor of need for coercive intervention. It has already been
observed that criminal laws describe a wide variety of behavior, always in
very severe language. 76 The BB through the window, the inscription of a
sign on a public street, the theft of a candy bar or toy are all doubtless
crimes and wrongful. But to say that one may confidently conclude that
every child of whatever age who engages in such behavior thereby unambiguously establishes his need for coercive intervention surely goes too
far. It is no answer, although it is true, that proof of a crime is a sufficient
basis for intervention in adult cases. Conviction in the criminal process
is, for one thing, designed to serve purposes beyond providing an occasion for rehabilitation. Principles of retribution and general deterrence
require public denunciation of the criminal act and its perpetrator, quite
without respect to the latter's dangerousness in the future. There are, indeed, instances in which punishment is levied when it is plain that the actor will never again commit a crime. 7 Moreover, to the extent that a
prediction of dangerousness is undertaken for adults who violate the law,
this prediction presupposes a mature understanding of the choices
available, from which one may infer something about their character
from the choice to engage in crime. The existence of a capacity for mature
choice is surely more doubtful in the case of a thirteen-year-old and,
therefore, the consequent assessment
of character based on conduct can8
7
not as confidently be made.

Nor, finally, could it be said that the dual condition would practically
operate only in cases of noncriminal misconduct, at least if experience in
other jurisdictions is a guide. A study of delinquency cases in two large
juvenile courts revealed that one-third of all cases in one court and ten
percent in the other were resolved by an order contemplating dismissal
despite proof or admission of a delinquent act. 79 More dramatic (and
doubtless more unusual) was the result in a New York case, in which
76

See text prior to note 69 supra.
77For a critique of this position even within the criminal law, see Katz, Dangerousness:A
Theoretical
Reconstruction of the CriminalLaw (pt. 1) 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 10 (1970).
78
Katz & Teitelbaum, supra note 5, at 26.
79W. STAPLETON & L. TEITELBAUM. supra note 11, at 66, Table III.1.
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charges of murder were dismissed against all members of a gang who, the
Family Court found, were not in need of "supervision, treatment, or confinement" by the court at the time the matter came to trial."
Provision of the dual condition to children involved in noncriminal
misconduct cannot, accordingly, justify the application of a "delinquency" label to those children, nor does its limitation to such children
seem appropriate. This does not, however, detract from the real benefits
that may accompany its adoption, even in limited form. Indeed, the fact
that an ungovernable, truant or runaway child may be adjudicated delinquent gives special point to the potential importance of the dual condition. For this potential to be realized, however, lawyers will have to
prepare as carefully for presentation of evidence concerning need for care,
supervision and rehabilitation as they do with respect to commission of
the delinquent act in question."' This requires investigation of the child's
condition and his relations with family members, and of the resources
and services available in the community.82 Effective use of the dual condition also presupposes willingness on the part of the juvenile court to hold
authentic hearings on this aspect of jurisdiction, which may indeed be required to support a finding that a child who engages in noncriminal
misconduct is in need of care.
JURISDICTION OVER PARENTS OF DELINQUENT CHILDREN

The new Code extends juvenile court jurisdiction to the parents of
delinquent children as well as to the juveniles themselves. Section 17 of
the law authorizes a prosecutor, probation officer or caseworker to file a
petition "to require the participation of a [delinquent child's] parent,
guardian, or custodian in a program of care, treatment, or rehabilitation
for his child." 3 If, upon such a petition, the court determines that the
parent should participate in such a program, it may order him to (1) obtain assistance in fulfilling his parental obligations; (2) provide specified
care or treatment for the child; or (3) work with a person providing care or
treatment for the child. 4 On a theoretical plane, .there is nothing very
novel about this addition to juvenile court jurisdiction. It seems, rather,
a belated recognition of what traditional doctrine presupposed-that the
prime cause of juvenile crime or other misconduct lies in parental failure.
Judge Ben Lindsey, one of the founders of the juvenile court movement,
observed in 1906 that "over half of the criminal inmates of prisons and institutions are from the youth of the nation, who arrive at the prison

80In re R., 67 Misc. 2d 452, 323 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Fam. Ct. 1971).

81IJA-ABA, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNCIL
FOR PRIVATE PARTIES § 4.3(b) commentary (Tent. Dr. 1976).
"Id.

§ 31-6-4-17 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
"Id. § 31-6-4-16(i).
"IND. CODE
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through neglect in childhood, and bad habits formed at the formative
period of life . *."..85
Twenty years later, another prominent juvenile
judge reiterated that central theme: "Remember the fathers and mothers
have failed, or the child has no business [in the juvenile court], and it is
when they failed that the state opened this way to receive them, into the
court, and said, 'This is the way in which we want you to grow up.' "86
These views of parental responsibility were often reflected in laws concerning "contributing" to the delinquency of a minor. Judge Lindsey's efforts for example, led to enactment in Colorado of a statute providing
that a parent responsible for "encouraging, causing or contributing to
the delinquency of [his minor] child" was guilty of a misdemeanor and
subject to fine or imprisonment.8 7 Indeed, imposition of responsibility on
the parents of delinquent children came sometimes to be viewed as a
necessary corollary of juvenile court jurisdiction.
The crime committed by the child is the same crime perhaps as
that committed by an adult, and in its effect upon society or
upon the injured persons may be identical, but we have said
that we will withhold punishment from the child for his offense
in recognition of the fact that he is not entirely responsible for
its commission, that heredity or environment, or the lack of appreciation of the consequences of his act ...

may have con-

spired to bring about its commission. May it not be said to be a
corollary to this proposition that just in so far as the responsibility of the child is reduced, the responsibility of some other
person or agency in increased? 88
"Contributing" laws, however widely adopted, 89 have rarely become an
integral part of juvenile court jurisdiction. In eleven states, their enforcement was left to the criminal rather than the juvenile court 0 and the
sanctions available were usually limited to fine or imprisonment.9 1
Although a number of states allow suspension of sentence upon conditions,92 this device has not often served as a successful vehicle for direct
regulation of parental behavior. And, without such regulation, the imposition of criminal sanctions seemed unlikely to strengthen the family

"Lindsey, The Juvenile Laws of Colorado, 18 GREEN BAG 126, 130 (1906).
"Cabot, The Detentionof Childrenas a Partof Treatment, in THE CHILD. THE CLINIC. AND
THE COURT 246, 249 (J. Addams ed. 1925).
87An Act to provide for the punishment of persons responsible for or contributing to the
delinquency of children, ch. 94, 1903 Colo. Sess. Laws 198.
"Bates, The Possibilities and Methods of Increasing Parental Responsibility for
Juvenile Delinquents, 12 J. CRIM. L. & C. 61, 62 (1921).
"See Ludwig, Delinquent Parents and the Criminal Law, 5 VAND. L. REv. 719, 737-45
app. (1952). For an earlier survey, see Bates, supranote 88.
"Ludwig, supra note 89, at 725. Indeed, legislative efforts to vest jurisdiction in courts
without general criminal jurisdiction were subject to constitutional challenge. Bates, supra
note 88, at 65-67.
9'Ludwig, supra note 89, at 726.
92Id
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or the child within it. Judge Paul Alexander, for one, concluded after an
extensive survey of prosecutions of parents in Toledo, that "to punish
parents who contribute to the delinquency or neglect of their children accomplishes very few, if any, of the things claimed for it except revenge .... ,"9 3 At a different level, criminal jurisdiction over the parents of

delinquent children has presented jurisdictional difficulties. Because it
cannot routinely be assumed that bad behavior by children is caused by
bad parenting, the nexus between act and harm that criminal law ordinarily presupposes is obscure. There are also problems of culpability
apart from causation.9 4 Ordinarily, criminal liability requires some
blameworthy state of mind-at least negligence-which canot be
established in the case of many parents. Although there are exceptions to
the requirements of culpability, 95 the necessity and fairness of such
6
departures is always viewed with suspicion.
The Indiana parental participation provision, like its analogue in
California,9 7 can be seen as an attempt to accomplish the goals sought
under the punitive approach first advocated by Judge Lindsey without
the difficulties and limitations inherent in the criminal law. 98 It is a
change in strategy based upon experience, rather than a novel principle.
The parental participation provision is also consistent with the revisionist approach to noncriminal misbehavior in its apparent recognition
that the parents of an ungovernable or runaway child may be as responsible for that situation as the youth who is the formal respondent in the
proceeding.9 9 The report of the National Advisory Committee on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, for example, recommends that
status offense jurisdiction over the child be replaced by "Family in Need
of Service Proceedings," with judicial power reaching not only the misbehaving child but his or her parents and any public institution or agency
with a legal responsibility to provide services to the child or the
parents. 100 Much the same effective range of power is contemplated by
the new Indiana Code.
93Alexander, What's This About PunishingParents? FED. PROBATION. March 1948, 23,
29. He does, however, suggest that the contributing law is sometimes useful "where the
parent is refractory." Ic
9Ludwig, supra note 89, at 727-31.
"See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) (misbranding of drugs);
Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 U. COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933); Wasserstrom, Strict
Liability in the CriminalLaw, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731 (1960).
"See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
7
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 727(2) (West Supp. 1979) provides: "The juvenile court may
direct any and all reasonable orders to the parents and guardians of the minor who is the
subject of any proceedings under this chapter as the court deems necessary and
proper....
98See Vincent, Expanding the Neglected Role of the Parentin the Juvenile Court 4 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 523, 534 (1977).
"See, e.g., text in note 14 supra; Andrews & Cohn, supra note 75, at 73-76. Parental
neglect has also been raised as an affirmative defense in juvenile cases alleging incorrigibility. See, e.g., In re G., 28 Cal. App. 3d 276, 104 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1972).
"'NATIONAL

ADVISORY
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Despite these broad roots, however, the parental responsibility section
of the new law presents substantive and procedural issues that warrant
attention.
Substantive Issues

The juvenile law in substance authorizes a court to require parents to
cooperate with agencies providing services, to accept assistance
themselves (presumably in the form of individual or group counseling,
therapy and the like) and to provide through, one supposes, purchase or
cooperation, services that, in the court's opinion, are needed by the child.
The only basis for such an order is a finding that the parent of a delinquent child should participate in one or more of the designated ways.1"'
No particular reason for this conclusion is required of the judge; it will apparently suffice that he or she believes parental participation a desirable
adjunct to the disposition imposed on the delinquent child.
So written, the Indiana provision goes well beyond the traditional occasions for juvenile court jurisdiction over parents. The problems
associated with "contributing" laws are dealt with simply by abandoning both penal sanctions and any requirement that the parent be
shown to have caused the delinquent act or have been legally culpable (intended, knew or was negligent) in respect of the child's behavior. The obvious alternative to basing jurisdiction over the parents of a delinquent
child on a showing of neglect, for which there is also authority, 10 ' has
likewise seemingly been rejected. Whereas a neglect finding requires
specific evidence of parental failure, 10 3 no allegation of inadequacy or unfitness is contemplated by the parental participation provision. It may
be, of course, that such participation will in some way serve the child's
"interests," but this fact-even if demonstrable-would not itself support an adjudication of parental neglect.' 0'
(1976). At disposition, the court
could order the parent, child, or family to cooperate with services offered by public or
private agencies. Id. at 480. For a similar proposal, see Gough & Grilli, The Unruly Child
and the Law: Toward a Focus on the Family, Juv. JUST., Nov. 1972, at 9.
' 11ND. CODE § 31-6-4-16(i) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
'- 2See Wald, State Intervention on Behalfof "Neglected" Children"A Search for Realistic
Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1035-36 (1975).
"'In order to find a child "in need of services" (neglected, under the Code's terminology),
the court must find that "(1) His physical or mental condition is substantially impaired as
a result of the refusal or neglect of his parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child
with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision; or (2) His
physical health is seriously endangered due to injury by the act or omission of his parent,
guardian, or custodian; or (3) Substantially endangers his own health or the health of
another ..
" IND. CODE § 31-6-4-3 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
"'The "best interests" test, despite the frequency of its invocation, is a dispositional
rather than an adjudicative standard. The definition of "child in need of services," quoted
in the preceding footnote, makes clear that this remains true under the new Code. The
Holding of the court in In re Bryant's Adoption, 134 Ind. App. 480, 493-94, 189 N.E.2d
593, 600 (1963), although uttered in connection with adoption proceedings, would apply as
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 320-21
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If jurisdiction over parents is not formally founded on misconduct that
would amount to neglect nor on some other causal responsibility for the
child's misconduct, on what is it based? The only apparent answer lies in
a power of the state to do things which are appropriate to assure to proper care and treatment of its children-in other words, that aspect of
police power which is called parenspatriae jurisdiction. 1 5 Whether this
doctrine, described by the Supreme Court as "murkey" in meaning and
with historic credentials of "dubious relevance,""1 6 will support the proposed intervention presents an issue of considerable difficulty. In part,
the result will depend on a calculus involving the importance of the state
interest, on the one hand, and the importance and degree of invasion of
the parental interest, on the other.
The state interest has already been described in categorical
terms-promoting the welfare of, and preventing further misconduct by,
children. Determination of the strength of this interest is less easy. The
suggestion has been made that intervention involving the parents of
delinquent children offers the best and perhaps the only hope for preventing future wrongdoing:
The point is that if the juveniles who come to the attention of
the court are to be helped to stay out of further trouble that
some form of intervention with their families is necessary....
It is not only important, but necessary to intervene in family
system§ in ways that will promote the development of more effective and more socially functional systems. For unless the
family is able to see itself in a new light and alter its system of
functioning one may expect a continuation of problems. To
take a youthful offender out of his family setting where he is
subject to the family system and deal with him by placing him
in detention, in a disciplinary school, or other setting may be
useful, even necessary. But from the point of view of helping
him keep clear of the law in the future such action is almost irrelevant.... In psychology we learned long ago the futility of
treating symptoms. The delinquent youngster is truly a symp10 7
tom. He is the symptom of a distressed family.
In this view, parental adequacy is largely a functional matter rather than
one defined by the existence of specific, categorical forms of failure.
Where there is delinquency, there is a need for improvement in the family
well to neglect cases: "[Tihe 'child's best interest rule' ... is never an issue for judicial
determination in an adversary adoption proceeding until the ultimate fact of 'abandonment or desertion' or 'failure to support,' has been first established by clear, cogent
and indubitable evidence." See also Note, Neglected Children and Their Parents in Indiana,
7 IND. L. REV. 1048, 1055 (1974).
' 05That authority over parents, absent neglect or "contributing," is based on the parens
patriae doctrine and has been suggested in connection with the parental participation provision of the California Code. Vincent, supranote 98, at 536.
1061n re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
,"Johnson, The Juvenile Offender and His Family, Juv. JUST.. Feb. 1975, at 34.
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which can only be accomplished through intervention in respect of
parents as well as their children.
There is, indeed, a common sense basis for saying that parents of delinquent children may need help in dealing with the latter's misbehavior,
even when they have neither neglected him nor causally contributed to
his misconduct. This may, indeed, be true even where the court removes
the child from the home for some period of time; if the parents can better
deal with him upon his return the chances of avoiding future delinquency
may be improved to that extent. What is unclear, however, is the extent
to which improvement can genuinely be expected. Where parents are inadequate and irresponsible a law aimed at reforming their behavior
would doubtless serve some plain purpose, but the Code contemplates
treatment for parents who may already have tried a variety of services
and remedies. There is, as well, reason to question the extent to which
court-imposed requirements of counseling and the like are generally effective, even where some need could be demonstrated. Despite some
seventy years of experience, there is little evidence to support the belief
that coercively imposed services of this kind are useful in any setting.
Lack of adequate training, high staff turnover, and difficulty in
attracting and retaining sufficient numbers of qualified minority group
professionals have all contributed to this doubtful record of success. 1 8 To
the extent these conditions obtain in Indiana, the value of yet further
reliance on undesired intervention through social work and allied services
must be questioned.
Against this state interest, one must consider the extent to which the
parental participation provision affects the interests of parents. To the
extent that relatively unimportant interests are involved or that even important interests are little affected, the statute would stand on relatively
firm ground. Three categories of parental interests seem to be implicated
by the court's dispositional power. One is a financial interest, to the extent parents may be called upon to pay for whatever counseling or
therapy they are ordered to provide or receive. 10 9 The second is a form of
privacy or liberty interest, to the extent parents are required personally
to participate in counseling or therapy. The third is an interest in the
custody and society of their children, to the extent that custody is conditioned upon cooperation with a dispositional order directed to them.
The financial interest of parents has frequently been considered in connection with laws requiring them to pay for treatment or services
rendered their children incident to juvenile court proceedings. An obliga'08See Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of 'Neglected' Children: A Search for Realistic
Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 997-98 (1975) and sources cited therein.'
0
' 1IND. CODE § 31-6-4-18 (Cum. Supp. 1979) provides that the county shall pay for any services ordered "by the juvenile court for any child or his parent, guardian, or custodian,"
but that the parent will be financially responsible for those services "unless . . . [hie is
unable to pay for them; ... [playment would force an unreasonable hardship .... or justice
would not be served by ordering payment."
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tion to pay for those services has usually been upheld, typically on the
theory that the services were "necessaries" which parents are customarily required to provide. 10 The same theory might support an order directing the parents to purchase services or treatment for the child. It
would not, however, so clearly justify an order to the parents to purchase
services for themselves, even on the theory that counseling or therapy
rendered to parents will ultimately redound to the benefit of their offspring. The requirement that a parent pay for his child's "necessaries" is
ordinarily considered a form of agency created by facts or law, and would
have no obvious applicability where no services or goods were provided
the child.
A requirement that parents undergo counseling or therapy also implicates interests of privacy and liberty. The strength of this interest is
difficult to weigh, simply because laws compelling submission to outpatient therapeutic treatment are extremely uncommon."' Perhaps the
closest common analogue is probation, but this is distinguishable since it
is coupled with the possibility and threat of incarceration. Comparison
might also be made with referral to drug abuse counseling or driver
education programs for first offenders, but these also differ in the onus
they place on the respondent. Surely a regime of treatment requiring
relatively formalized education is less intrusive than one which contemplates psychological counseling, particularly with respect to such intimate matters as relations among family members."' While such treatment can doubtless be required of parents who have demonstrated failure
or inadequacy, its imposition without such a showing presents signifi3
cant questions about the appropriate reach of the law."

"'E.g., In re Shaib, 250 Cal. App. 2d 553, 58 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1967); Jesmer v. Dundon, 29
N.Y.2d 5, 271 N.E.2d 905, 323 N.Y.S.2d 417, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 953 (1971). See
also In re Ricky H., 2 Cal. 3d 513, 468 P.2d 204, 86 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1970)(attorney's fee for
child).
"'Laws providing for involuntary outpatient treatment are usually recent responses
emerging from the least restrictive alternative doctrine in civil commitment litigation.
Legal Issues in State MentalHealth Care:Proposalsfor Change: Civil Commitment, [JulyAug. 1977] MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 73, 110. They often incorporate the same substantive requirements as secure commitment provisions.
"'The emphasis given to confidentiality of therapist-patient communications reveals
much about the effect of counseling or therapy upon the latter's privacy. Ralph Slovenko
has observed that "[t]he very essence of psychotherapy is confidential personal revelations
about matters which the patient is (and should be) normally reluctant to reveal or discuss."
R. SOLVENKO. PSYCHOTHERAPY. CONFIDENTIALITY, AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION 40
(1966). The essence of imposed therapy or counseling is, therefore, a requirement that
parents reveal highly personal matters which they would ordinarily and understandably be
reluctant to discuss.
"'The traditional nature of the parental participation requirement is revealed by
reference to the basic premises of juvenile court jurisdiction. Whereas criminal law intervened only when minimum standards of behavior are violated, juvenile courts sought to
do so when it seemed necessary to lead children to become good and useful citizens. See W.
STAPLETON & L. TEITELBAUM. IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH 9-10 (1972). The morality of American
law has been described as that "of the Old Testament and the Ten Commandments ....It
does not condemn men for failing to embrace opportunities for the fullest realization of
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In addition to its impact on personal privacy, the parental participation order affects the parent-child relationship in ways that touch on the
former's long-recognized interests in "maintaining the integrity of [the]
family unit. ' 1' 1 4 It is, of course, true that any juvenile court jurisdictional
order interferes with that relationship in some respect, perhaps by requiring the child to counsel with a stranger (probation officer) or even by
removing him from the home. Since, however, delinquency (or status offense) dispositions are aimed at the child and do not normally presume
parental failure, only limited interference with parental rights is contemplated. Even commitment to a "Boys School" or "Girls School" does
not permanently or totally remove parental rights; it only temporarily
transfers guardianship for some purposes. Moreover, the principal thrust
of intervention is to support parental authority rather than to supplant it
or to require changes on the part of adult family members.
The effects of a delinquency finding coupled with a parental participation order under the new Code go considerably farther than conventional
delinquency dispositions. Indeed, they are-except for application of a
formal label-identical in practice with those accompanying a neglect adjudication. The child, whether delinquent or "in need of services," may be
placed under probation supervision, ordered to receive out-patient treatment of various kinds, or placed in a foster home or shelter care facility. 1 5
The parents may be required to participate in the disposition in either
proceeding. Thus a case initiated because of the child's law violation, or
even his disobedience and truancy, may for all functional purposes be
converted into what is in substance a neglect action.
Viewed in this way, the parental participation section presents hard
questions concerning the basis for regulating parental behavior within
the family. It is at least questionable whether a bare finding that such intervention is desirable and, perhaps, that it is in the child's interests
would alone serve as an adequate basis for assertion of neglect jurisdiction. Although there is little constitutional authority concerning the
limits of state power in this respect, the Supreme Court has on at least
one recent occasion suggested that "the Due Process Clause would be offended '[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural
family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without
some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was

their power. Instead, it condemns them for failing to respect the basic requirements of
social living." L. FULLER. THE M}ORALITY OF LAW 6 (1964). Where, however, the law seeks to
require excellence rather thanadequacy, however defined-as the parental responsibility
law seemingly does-serious questions of jurisprudence are created.
" 4Alsager v. District Court of Polk County, 406 F. Supp. 10, 16 (S.D. Iowa 1975). See also
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.") (citation omitted).
".IND. CODE § 31-6-4-16(e) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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thought to be in the children's best interest.' "1116 The Court has also indicated that the parental interests in custody of a child are" 'essential'..
., 'basic civil rights of man' ... and '[r]ights far more precious... than
property rights,' "which are entitled to "deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection."' 1 7
Two qualifications on the thrust of these opinions warrant attention.
The first is that the Indiana parental participation provision is not triggered solely by a finding of "best interests" but by such a finding in connection with a delinquency adjudication. While there is no showing of
parental failure rising to the level of statutory neglect, there is an adjudication of juvenile deviance giving rise to governmental concern.
Whether such a basis will suffice to justify authority over the parents as
well as the child is an issue yet to be seriously considered, much less
resolved.
The second qualification goes to the extent of intervention undertaken.
Most recent decisions announcing strong or even fundamental parental
interests in the rearing of their children have involved governmental action resulting in permanent and total disruption of parental rights.1 1 8 To
the extent that less drastic intervention in the parent-child relation is
undertaken, less in the way of fault or failure on the parent's part may be
required. It is not clear, however, that these cases are limited in
significance to instances of permanent disruption of the parent-child relation. The Court has manifested solicitude for parental rights in a variety
of areas apart from termination,1 9 which may surely be affected even by
more limited forms of intrusion.
For that matter, it is not even clear that a delinquency adjudication
coupled with a parental participation order cannot lead to total abrogation of parental rights. Parental rights can be terminated with respect to
delinquent children as well as those in need of services as the new Code
reads. 110 There must be a showing that the child has been removed from
his parent for at least six months under a dispositional decree; there is a
rdasonable probability that the conditions resulting in his removal have
not been remedied; reasonable services have been offered or provided the
parent to assist him in fulfilling parental obligations, which have been rejected or proved ineffective; termination is in the child's best interests;
and some satisfactory alternative plan has been developed by the county.
It appears that all of these conditions might be satisfied in respect of a
delinquent child who has been placed in shelter care (or, presumably, in
"'Quillion v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (citation omitted).
1"Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citation omitted).
1'In both Quillion v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972), for example, the proceedings would lead, immediately or sequentially, to termination
of parental rights.
"'Compare Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) with Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923).
"MIND. CODE § 31-6-5-4 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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an Industrial School), and whose parents have failed to take advantage of
some dispositional decree directed to them. Whether non-participation or
incomplete participation in such an order-which was never itself
founded on a finding of parental inadequacy or failure-could justify termination of parental rights obviously presents a genuine constitutional
problem.
ProceduralIssues
Full exploration of the procedural rights that may be maintainable by a
parent subject to a participation order is beyond the scope of this discussion. A few issues may be worth raising, however, even if only briefly and
inconclusively.
Party Status
The notion of "party status"12' 1 is used here to describe the right to participate in the determination which justifies exertion of authority over a
person. It includes, for example, notice, the right to attend hearings and
an opportunity to present and challenge evidence upon which an adjudication will be based. It will immediately be obvious that the parent in
a delinquency case has only a qualified party status, even where he may
be required to participate in the dispositional scheme. He is entitled to
notice of the possibility that such an obligation will be imposed upon
him " and, in proceedings to determine whether participation should be
ordered, to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him and to obtain and present testimony on his own behalf.1 2 3 The parent apparently is
not, however, entitled to participate at any stage prior to entrance of an
24
adjudication of the child's delinquency.1
There are good reasons to support the decision not to allow parental
participation at the adjudication stage. The costs associated with such a
procedure, whether the parent was sympathetic or antagonistic to the
child's position, have neatly been summarized by the IJA-ABA Juvenile
Justice Standards Project in its Standards Relating to Pretrial Court
Proceedings:
Presumably, the parent could demand a trial when the juvenile
and counsel for the juvenile had decided (as a result, perhaps,
of bargaining with the presecutor) to admit to the allegations
of the petition. The parent could call witnesses whom neither
the prosecution nor the defense desired to call, or the parent
"'21This notion is borrowed from IJA-ABA,

JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT. STAN-

DARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS

cited as

PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS).

22
. IND. CODE
123

§ 31-6-7-4(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
1d. § 31-6-3-2(a).
' Id § 31-6-3-2(a), -2(b).
24

112-13 (Tent. Dr. 1977) [hereinafter
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could ask questions of the prosecution witnesses that defense
counsel, for strategic reasons, chose not to ask. These and
other possible conflicts in strategy between the parent and the
juvenile could pose substantial risks to the freedom of counsel
for the juvenile to conduct the defense....
On the other hand, "competition" between the parent and
the petitioner [sic] could occur if a hostile parent were a party
and called witnesses, made motions, and took other steps intended to establish the allegations of delinquency. This might
by a party who was the combe attempted, for example,
1 25
plainant in the case.

One might add as well the prospect of the parent "defending" his child
while at the same time seeking to make clear his own lack of responsibility for what occurred, thereby confusing the proceedings considerably
and resulting in additional consumption of time and personnel made
necessary by a tripartite proceeding.
It cannot be forgotten, however that adjudication of the child's delinquency is also an essential element of the parental participation proceeding, and one the parent cannot challenge. The plea bargain situation,
used above to illustrate the difficulties with allowing the parents to play
a full role at adjudication, also reveal the effects of qualified participation
on the parent's position. A child may well be advised by compentent
counsel that, although some defense can be raised, its success is so
unlikely that acceptance of a bargain to admit responsibility in exchange
for a recommendation of probation (or less) would be desirable. If the
child agrees to that bargain, the effect of his plea will be to establish the
critical element upon which authority over the parent is based. All that is
further required is a showing that the parent "should" participate in the
dispositional scheme, a matter seemingly entrusted as a practical matter
to the judge's discretion.
This limitation on the role of the parent subject to a dispositional order
raises a significant constitutional question. The Juvenile Justice Standards Project, dealing only with traditional dispositions such as probation or commitment, came to the conclusion that some form of participation was required but that restricting the parent's role to the disposition
stage of delinquency cases would satisfy the requirements of Stanley v.
Illinois1 2 6 and other cases establishing procedural requifements for proceedings affecting a parent's right to the custody and care of his
children.1 27 In doing so, however, the Project distinguished dispositions
in delinquency cases from those in neglect or termination of parental
rights proceedings on the grounds that (1) the primary impact of delinquency decisions is on the child rather than on the parents, and (2) the
... PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS

at 112.

'26405 U.S. 645 (1972).
12PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS

at 114-16.
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parent in a delinquency matter will lose only physical custody and that
for only a short period, whereas a more grievous loss is involved at least
in termination actions. 128 Assuming arguendo that these distinctions are
indeed sufficient to reduce the procedural protections applicable to
parents in conventional delinquency matters, the Indiana parental participation provision includes a direct impact on the parents which is, except for stigma, quite the same as that which would be associated with a
neglect proceeding. 12 9 Moreover, as we have also seen, the adjudication of
delinquency coupled with a parental participation order may establish a
foundation for termination of parental rights. 130 Accordingly, it is at least
arguable that-having regard to the dispositional power over parents
vested by the Code in the trial judge-denial of a right to be heard with
respect to a critical element of that power creates procedural due process
problems beyond those presented by traditional laws.
Counsel
The parent occupies not only a qualified party status with respect to
delinquency proceedings from which some obligations on his own part
may derive, but has no right to appointed counsel at the dispositional
stage where he may participate.1 3 1 Here, it should be said, his position
under the Code is the same as if a proceeding to declare a child "in need of
services" had been initiated."' 2 Whether a parent faced with neglect proceedings is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel is still to
be decided by the United States Supreme Court. Under the traditional
view, "neglect" and "dependency" cases were civil matters to which the
right to counsel did not attach. With In re Gault,3 3 however, entire
reliance on the civil-criminal distinction was no longer tenable, as the
Supreme Court itself observed in connection with juveniles facing socalled "civil" delinquency proceedings.1 3 4 A number of state and lower
federal courts have since looked behind the "civil" label associated with
neglect actions and concluded that, in view of the importance of the
3
parental interest in the custody of his child"
' and the potentially over-

"'ld. at 115.
"'See note 115 & accompanying text supra.
"'See
note 120 & accompanying text supra.
' 31 IND. CODE § 31-6-3-2(c) (Cum. Supp. 1979) provides only that a parent is entitled to
representation by counsel "in proceedings to terminate the parent-6hild relationship."
"'Id
§ 31-6-3-2.
'3387 U.S. 1 (1967).
"'Id.at 49-50.
"'1The importance of the parental interest in the rearing of his children was most forcefully stated in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). For other cases recognizing this interest in the content of neglect proceedings, see Danforth v. State Department of Health &
Welfare, 303 A.2d 794 (Me. 1973); In re Ella B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 356-57, 285 N.E.2d 288, 290.
334 N.Y.S.2d 133, 136 (1972); Cleaver v. Wilcon, 40 U.S.L.W. 2658, 2659 (N.D. Cal. 1972)
(otherwise unreported), rev' on other grounds, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974).
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whelming power of the state brought to bear against the parent in child
protective proceedings,1 3 6 access to the assistance of counsel is constitu13 7
tionally required.
While certain resolution of the constitutional issue must await
Supreme Court action, it ought also be asked whether, in point of policy,
it is desirable to deny indigent parents access to legal representation in
cases which may both affect their relationship with their children and impose affirmative obligations of cooperation upon them. There are powerful reasons for providing such assistance and few reasons, other than
financial, for refusing to do so.138 And, indeed, a considerable number of
states have moved to make legal assistance
available to parents in
1 39
neglect cases as a matter of sound policy.
SOME GENERAL THOUGHTS ABOUT THE NONCRIMINAL DELINQUENT
Much of the-discussion to this point has concerned specific provisions
which affect the scope of delinquency jurisdiction over both children and
parents. The much disputed general question of how the law ought to
deal with children who are incorrigible or have run away has been held in
abeyance. This issue should, however, be addressed briefly, not only
because it is the focus of most recent discussions of juvenile court
jurisdiction but because the Code's approach will add yet more impetus
to that discussion.
Three models for dealing with children who commit noncriminal acts
have been widely used or considered. The first-employed in Indiana until now-is the traditional approach under which no distinction is drawn
between criminal and noncriminal misbehavior for adjudicative or
dispositional purposes. 140 A second view, approximated but not com-.
pletely adopted by the new Code, is to differentiate treatment at some or
all stages of the juvenile justice system.14 ' A third approach, much
discussed but not yet adopted, removes jurisdiction over noncriminal
misbehavior from juvenile courts and allocates responsibility for working
with families in conflict to (voluntary) community services. 4 2 The Indiana Code-introduces a modification of the first two approaches. Like
'3 6See Danforth v. State Department of Health & Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 799-800 (me.
1973); Note, A Case of Neglect Parens PatriaeVersus Due Process in Child Neglect Proceedings, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 1055 (1975); Note, Representationin Child-Neglect Cases:Are
Parents Neglected, 4 U. COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROB. 230, 250 (1968).
'"See, in addition to cases and authorities cited in the preceding two notes, Crist v. Division of Youth & Family Services, 128 N.J. Super. 402, 320 A.2d 203 (1974); Lemaster v.
Oakley, 203 S.E.2d 140 (W.Va. 1974).
"'See in addition to sources cited in note 136, supra, Comment, A Recommendation for
Court-Appointed Counsel in Child-Abuse Proceedings,46 MISS. L. J. 1072, 1094-95 (1975).
139Itappears that, as of 1975, 35 jurisdictions provided for appointed counsel in neglect
cases. Katz, Howe & McGrath, ChildNeglect Laws inAmerica, 9 FAM.L. Q. 1, 10-11 (1975).
1'1See notes 10-12 & accompanying text supra.
"'See notes 13-18 & accompanying text supra.
"'See NON-CRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR, supranote 68.
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the revisionist view, it differentiates the dispositional treatment of
status offenders from that of law violators and provides that jurisdiction
can only be asserted upon a specific showing of need for judicial intervention. On the other, the Code retains the traditional "delinquency" label
for all misbehaving children. Finally, it extends both traditional and revisionist views by allowing the court to exercise power over the parents as
well as the child once an adjudication of delinquency is entered.
On balance, the approach to noncriminal misconduct taken by the Code
reaffirms traditional juvenile court theory even where its practice differs
from the original statute. Parental failure, as we have seen, has long been
identified as a prime cause of youthful misbehavior and as a causative
element in status offenses. Accordingly, incorporation of a mechanism
for direct intervention-the parental participation provision-is only a further (and indeed obvious) step along a well-beaten
path. The one real departure from the original view, prohibition of commitment of status offenders to secure institutions, may also be an effort
to re-create the juvenile court ideal for at least some children. Since
"Boys Schools" and "Girls Schools" seem frequently if not inevitably to
assume the characteristics of an adult prison, separate treatment for noncriminal youths serves as a vehicle for providing them the kind of treat-
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ment once hoped for all children.

The new Code thus rests upon much the same premises as those which
led to creation of the juvenile court. Certainly it maintains the assumptions that (1) incorrigibility and like misconduct reveal some failure in
socialization that, without correction, will lead to further and more
serious wrongdoing, and (2) that judicial intervention can correct these
failures. The balance of this discussion will focus on criticisms of these
assumptions and, therefore, on the validity of status offense jurisdiction
itself.
The Significance of Youthful Disobedience

Most simply, traditional juvenile court theory treats youthful disobedience as proto-criminal behavior. The child who does not respect the
authority of his family will not, it is feared, respect the laws of the larger
society. The proof of this proposition is found in widely held beliefs that
the family constitutes a microcosm of the general community and in
evidence suggesting that many delinquents and adult criminals were at
some time incorrigible, truant or the like.

43

' A proponent of the New York Family Court Act of 1963 wrote of its provision
separating noncriminal from criminal misconduct in terms her grandmother might have
used for all juvenile court jurisdiction: "In this class of cases there is no need for judicial
power, as in the case of crimes, in order to protect the community .... The goal is only to
help the child .... "Dembitz, Fermentand Experiment in New York: Juvenile Cases in the
New Family Court 48 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 506 (1963) (emphasis added).
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Neither of these sources of belief is, however, unimpeachable. Like
most truisms, they have some real basis and, like many, they are not as
conclusive as they sometimes seem. The view of the family as a "little
commonwealth" was surely a central article of faith in Puritan
ideology, 4 4 but-except rhetorically-has long been abandoned as a
viable theory. The Puritan world view was essentially static, with both
government and family serving as vehicles for enforcing received truth
through inculcation of prevailing values on their respective memberships. 146 The entire thrust of progressive thought, from which juvenile
court sprang, was in the other direction. Progress in the world would be
achieved through rejection of existing social conditions and values by the
young. To this end, progressive education was substituted for mastery of
present knowledge and enlightened child-rearing was undertaken where
parents were found-as they often were-to be inadequate. Indeed, a
dominant theme of 18th and 19th century social theory was the necessity
of government intervention to replace the authority of families, in part
because parents were in any event losing their effectiveness 146 and in part
conditions
because they were representatives of those existing social
47
which, it was expected, their children would leave behind.1
The curious thing is that juvenile court theory never fully recognized
the gulf between the Puritan views embodied in colonial incorrigibility
laws and the progressive ideology it sought to advance. Consequently, it
adopted from Puritan sources a body of laws declaring that disobedience
to parental authority is, almost ipso facto, bad and at the same moment
encouraged governmental intervenion in education and child-rearing on
the assumption that parental authority was of doubtful value. This contradiction has never since been resolved successfully.148

The other basis for considering incorrigibility an indication of future
dangerousness-the observation that many criminals were once in con-

1"See Teitelbaum & Harris, Some HistoricalPerspectives on GovernmentalRegulation
of Childrenand Parents,in BEYOND CONTROL 1 (1977).
141Id. at 5-14.
"'Concern about the adequacy of immigrant parents had been expressed since the middle of the 18th century, and was no less salient at the turn of the 20th century. Judge
Mack, whose humanitarianism is unquestionable, observed that "[m]ost of the children
who come before the [juvenile] court are, naturally, the children of the poor. In many cases
the parents are foreigners, frequently unable to speak English, and without an understanding of American methods and views." Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV.
104, 116-17 (1909). For a less gentle view of this phenomenon, see Henderson, Are Modern

Industry and City Life Unfavorable to the Family?, in

AMERICAN SOCIALOGICAL SOCIETY.

93, 104-05 (1972) (reprint of 3 Papers and Proceedings of the American
Sociological Society (1908)).
1"'For an expression of this view in connection with education, consider Richard
Hofstadter's description of John Dewey's Theory: "If a democratic society is truly to
serve all its fnembers, it must devise schools in which, at the germinal point in childhood,
these members will be able to cultivate their capacities and, instead of simply reproducing
the qualities of the larger society, will learn how to improve them." R. HOFSTADTER, ANTIINTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE 362-63 (1963).
'See Teitelbaum & Harris, supranote 144, at 31-35.
THE FAMILY
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flict with their parents-provides a textbook illustration of the logical
fallacy, post hoc ergo propterhoc. In general, predicting delinquency and
criminality is an uncertain and often unsuccessful business. 14 9 In particular, predicting criminality from intra-family conflict proves far too
much. While it may well be true that most adult criminals were frequently disobedient to parental commands, the same can be said of most
adult noncriminals. Given that incorrigibility means "habitual" disobedience to parental commands and that "habitual" usually means "more
than once,'150 few among us can deny having been incorrigible at some
point. The condition of adolescence makes this virtually inevitable.
These points have already been raised in connection with the "dual condition" for jurisdiction and differentiation of the treatment of status offenders from that of other delinquents.'5 ' Does, however, inclusion of a requirement that the child be found "in need of care, rehabilitation, or
treatment" meet these objections to inferring dangerousness from disobedience? Certainly it might, if one could be sure of what such a finding
embodied and if one knew that a disobedient child in need of care would,
absent intervention, become a deviant adult. The difficulty is, of course,
that the term "in need of care" is so unclear as not to mean anything to
any judge. Nor, one suspects, could the term be made much clearer, as
long as we do not know under what circumstances a child in conflict with
his parents comes to be in conflict with the larger community or if, for
that matter, any relation exists between these phenomena.
The Effectiveness of Court Intervention
Even if some degree of future dangerousness could be inferred from
disobedient behavior, it remains to be asked whether court intervention
is likely to be successful in dealing with incorrigible or runaway children.
There is increasing belief that it is not. A California legislative committee
found some years ago that "[niot a single shred of evidence exists to indicate that any significant number of [beyond control childred] have
benefited [by juvenile court intervention]. In fact, what evidence does exist points to the contrary." 152 Recently, the Institute for Judicial
Administration-American Bar Association Juvenile Justice Standards
Project came to the same conclusion:
[U]ngovernability cases present for resolution issues that are
peculiarly ill-suited for, and unbenefitted by, legal analysis and
judicial fact finding.... The law is simply inept as a corrective
M'See E. SCHUR. RADICAL NON-INTERVENTION 46-51 (1973).
'"For a discussion of various formulations of incorrigibility laws, see Katz & Teitelbaum,
PINS Jurisdiction, the Vagueness Doctrine, and the Rule of Law, 53 IND. L.J. 1, 11-16
(1978).
"'See notes 67-68 & accompanying text supra.
"'Report of the California Assembly Interim Committee on Criminal Procedure,
JUVENILE COURT PROCESSES 7 (1971), quoted in NON-CRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR at 3.
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of the kinds of family dysfunction that these cases most frequently involve, which are "of vastly greater duration, intimacy, complexity, and (frequently) emotional intensity"
than other cases in the justice system.1 3
A variety of observations explain these pessimistic verdicts about the
utility of intervention in status offense matters. One, already articulated,
is that intra-family conflict presents problems for which judicial action is
singularly inappropriate. Parent-child cases involve long-term disputes
which mean different things within each family. The circumstances
which lead to a petition suggest the complexity of such matters. One set
of parents may want a child removed from the home because he is a financial burden or social embarrassment; a second may be seeking help
through the court which, at least for the wealthy, would be available
through private sources, and a third may simply wish the court to supply
an authority it cannot, or can no longer, exercise.1 4 However excellent
courts may be at determining whether a single incident, such as the taking of property, offends some generally accepted norm of conduct, they
are far less so in ascertaining the significance of disobedience to particularistic rules which differ from family to family. 15 This is even more
the case since disobedience at some point characterizes, perhaps
necessarily, the process by which a child moves toward that independence which is indispensable to adulthood.
Resort to judicial intervention may, indeed, be harmful as well as inept
in these case. The process by which incorrigibility cases are presented
and resolved itself gives reason for this concern. A parent who goes to
court is required to make a public denunciation of his or her child. The
child must either accede to that attack on his worth or reject it and,
thereby, the parent who initiated the denunciation. It is hard to believe
that strengthening of the parent-child relationship will routinely result
from such a confrontation and there is considerable reason to fear that
the cycle of public deprecation and disrespect will deepen antagonisms
within the family."' However, the proceeding may ultimately force other
family members to align themselves with either the complaining parent
or the respondent child, thereby isolating
even members who are formally
57
noncombatant in the official conflict."

113NON-CRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR at

11.

"'Mahoney, PINS and Parents,in BEYOND

CONTROL supra note 144, at 161, 162-67.
"Cf J. GOLDSTEIN, A FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 8
(1973) (remarking that courts are "incapable... of effectively managing, except in a very

gross sense, so delicate and complex a relationship as that between parent and child").
"16Mahoney, supra note 154, at 168. That resort to law may not strengthen parental
authority or familial unity was explicitly recognized in Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), where the Court observed that a parental veto over the
abortion decision was unlikely to "enhance partental authority or control where the minor
and the non-consenting parent are so fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of
the pregnancy already has fractured the family structure." Id at 175.
1571d.
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There are further possibilities of harm which must be considered if, as
is almost always the case, 5 8 the petition is ultimately sustained. The
child has formally been labeled a wrongdoer. Under the new Code,
moreover, he is formally labeled a "delinquent." The potential effects of
such labeling have already been mentioned,'59 and need little further
discussion. There is, however, a further effect in incorrigibility proceedings which deserves brief attention: the negative perception of the
child by himself and his own family.160 In these cases, the parent has
selected the child for public disapproval and will therefore be committed
to that view of the child. Accordingly, family support which might
counteract a label instigated by a stranger will probably be absent,
leaving the child to deal alone with the perception of his wrongfulness.
Finally, there is systematic reason to think that reliance on court proceedings will diminish the parental authority it purports to strengthen.
We have already observed that the process by which cases are presented
has some tendency to undermine family unity. The very resort to outside
authority may have the same effect. Philip Slater has observed that
whenever one appeals to a source of authority outside the family to
resolve intrafamilial conflict, the result must be to "democratize" the
family-that is, to weaken the authority of parents over their child.' 6 '
Consideration of the meaning of court intervention suggests why this is
so. Parental authority is essentially personal: it amounts to a requirement that the child will obey because the parent says so, and not because
of the importance of any particular command. The authority of the court,
by contrast, is necessarily rule-oriented in some degree; the law will intervene only if a rule of obedience has been violated by a showing that, for
example, the command was lawful and reasonable. 62 This the child is free
to contest, placing him for purposes of court action on a level of equality
with the parent. Moreover, even where the court ultimately sustains the
parental command, the lesson learned by the child is that parental
authority is not general and uncontrolled, although its limits will remain
obscure. The result is a double bind of no mean proportions. The
substance of the court's decision-"obey commands that are
reasonable"-purports to uphold parental authority, but because it is a
decision based on a rule independent of parental desire, it necessarily suggests some range of freedom to disobey. This in effect contradicts the
meaning of authority from the parental perspective. However, the range
"'Successful denials of incorrigibility complaints are so uncommon as to be practically

unheard of. See, e.g., Andrews & Cohn, supra note 75, at 58 (no observed instance of a successful defense in an extensive study of the New York City Family Court).
"'See notes 55-58 & accompanying text supra.
1'6See Mahoney, supra note 154, at 167-68.
"'Slater, Social Change and the DemocraticFamily, in THE TEMPORARY SOCIETY 20, 47
(1968).
'"IND. CODE § 31-6-4-1(a)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1979) ("habitually disobeys the reasonable and
lawful commands of his parents").
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of freedom conferred is necessarily unknowable. Because no child can
predict what a court would consider "reasonable" under future circumstances, he must therefore guess at what his proper ambit of choice
will be at any future time. This paradox illustrates why incorrigibility
jurisdiction can neither support parental authority nor enhance the
163
child's development toward adulthood.
Because of these difficulties, and because attention to cases involving
noncriminal misbehavior is expensive and diverts scarce resources
needed in other areas, 16 4 a number of authorities have urged abolition of
court jurisdiction over status offenses.165 This does not mean, it should be
said, elimination of state concern for and assistance to families in conflict. Rather, it calls for substitution of voluntary services to families, in
the belief that such services will more likely be effective than coercively
imposed requirements and that, by avoiding the court process, some
harm to participants can be avoided. 166 Two practical questions are raised
by such proposals. One is whether community services will be utilized
unless there is some residual power to require cooperation by children
who disobey their parents or run away; the other is whether elimination
of court power will not in some cases expose a child to grave risks. At this
point, no confident answer can be given, simply because no jurisdiction
has yet entirely abolished court authority over noncriminal misbehavior.
Some things can, however, be said. One is that there is evidence suggesting that coercively imposed services are not generally helpful in
parent-child conflict situations, so the problem is not one of replacing one
reasonably successful program with a speculative alternative. A second
point is that, where experiments with diversion of status offenders have
been conducted, a significant level of cooperation with voluntary agencies was achieved and at a significant savings in cost.

67

Thus, it is not ir-

responsible to consider, at least experimentally, non-judicial methods of
delivering services to children in conflict with their families.
The extent of danger to those youths whose rupture with their families
has become severe or permanent is harder to resolve satisfactorily. Many
of these children can in fact be reached by the court, where they are
16See generally Katz & Teitelbaum, supra note 150.
1'6Nationally, status offense cases probably comprise somewhere between one-third and
one-half of the workload of juvenile courts. NON-CRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR, supra note 68, at
1. Moreover, it appears that status offenders are more likely than law violators to be detained and processed through the courts, which means that they will consume proportionately more services and time. I& at 6; Andrews & Cohn, supranote 75, at 70, 75-76.
1"'E.g., NON-CRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY,
JURISDICTION OVER STATUS OFFENSES SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE JUVENILE COURT
(Policy Statement, Oct. 22, 1974); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME

27 (1967); CALIFORNIA

ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMITTEE, REPORT ON JUVENILE VIOLENCE

56-57

(1974).
' NoN-CRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR, supra note

68, at 15.

6'For descriptions of two such experiments and their results, see NON-CRIMINAL

MISBEHAVIOR.

supranote 68, at 16-19.
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neglected (as are many children treated as status offenders)M or commit

criminal acts. There are nevertheless some runaways, unknown in
number, who will live in dangerous circumstances and will not choose to
participate in voluntary services. What must be decided is whether any
program, coercive or not, will help these children and, if so, at what cost.
True, maintenance of court jurisdiction will allow them to be placed on
probation, but this seems of doubtful value for the truly intransigent
child. Placement in a shelter care facility or foster home would seem to
help only those children who might voluntarily accept such placement;
the confirmed incorrigible or run away would probably leave these nonsecure facilities almost as quickly as he would leave his own home. Nor
would commitment to a secure institution, now prohibited by the Code,
seem a better solution. Incarceration removes him from one undesirable
environment in favor of another which may be, in different ways, almost
as undesirable and without any great promise of improving the child's
ability to function at home or in the larger community. Against these
doubts must, however, be placed the costs generally associated with
assertion of court jurisdiction over status offenders. In short,
maintenance of jurisdiction in order to respond to an admittedly difficult
class of cases may not be justified either in terms of help to that class or
of the effect on other cases which will predictably be brought to the court.
CONCLUSION

The new Indiana juvenile law is at the same time bold and conservative. Where the Code extends court power, as it does with respect to
parents of delinquent children, it does so in order to pursue goals traditionally served by juvenile court theory. Where the Code contracts court
power, as it does with respect to commitment of children who engage in
noncriminal misbehavior, it also does so in the service of traditional
values. Thus, while the new law contains a variety of changes in juvenile
court jurisdiction, these changes are ultimately designed to reaffirm and
strengthen the competence of that agency for dealing with children.
The Code accordingly presents both new and old business for consideration. To the extent that it creates new areas of judicial authority,
the propriety of such power-even justified by reference to traditional
parenspatriaedoctrine-must be determined. And, to the extent that the
law reaffirms old strategies for dealing with misbehaving children, recurring questions about the effectiveness of those strategies will again be
asked.

'6 See note 75 & accompanying text supra.

